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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal in a criminal proceedings from a Judgment and Order after a Jury 
trial and conviction of Driving Under the Influence, a Third Degree Felony, entered by 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, by the 
Honorable Claudia Laycock, in the Fourth District Court. Statutory authority exists for 
this Appeal based upon the Rule 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Defendant is released on condition of completing Adult Parole and Probation after 
sentencing and the courts denial of a certificate of probable cause. 
PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
There are no related or prior appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
AND CITATIONS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED 
INCLUDING THE SECOND CHEMICAL FOLLOWING A PRE-ARREST 
CHEMICAL TEST USING A PORTABLE TEST 
a. The applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting authority; When a 
case involves consent to a search and legal remedies, the Court affords little discretion to 
the district court because there must be a state-wide standards that guide law enforcement 
and prosecutorial officials. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). Because this 
case involves the legality of a search and seizure, the district court's determination of law 
on these issues should have been afforded little deference by the Court of Appeals. State 
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125. A trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress is 
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reviewed on a bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations 
under a clearly erroneous standard and reviewing its legal Conclusions for correctness. 
State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah 1994); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1999) 
b. Citation to record showing issues preserved in Trial Court: Motion to Suppress (R. 
28)(Addendum,pg21) 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PRETRIAL MOTIONS AND DENING JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS MADE BY THE STATE AND DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN NOT ALLOWING MR. MANWARING TO PRESENT 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO THE DEFENDANT'S ALCOHOL 
LEVEL AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENCE 
a. The applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting authority; The 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996). Whether the trial 
court correctly admitted evidence is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Stewart, 925 P.2d 598, 599-600 (Utah App. 1996). A question of statutory interpretation 
is reviewed for correctness and give no deference to the conclusions of the trial court." 
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14, \\ 1. 
b. Citation to record showing issues preserved in Trial Court: Motion to Strike 
Instructions Concerning Point 0.08 Level of Breath Testing and to Limit Evidence (R. 
168)(Addendum, pg 76) Ruling of the court indicating adequate record was made by 
Defendant. (R. 457, Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 99) Motion to Dismiss based on 
limitation of defenses. (R. 458 Tr. [09/29/08 p.m. session] pg. 165) The Defendant made 
Exception to jury instructions. (R. 459 Tr. [09/30/08 p.m. session] pg. 9 to 44) 
3. THE DUI STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §41-6A-502(A)(I) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND SUBSECTION (1) OF 41-
6A-502 OF THE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE STATUTE AS APPLIED AND 
ON ITS FACE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
a. The applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting authority; 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^  42, 99 P.3d 
820 (constitutional challenges to statutes); State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 8, 84 P.3d 
1171 (statutory interpretation); State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah 1995) (trial 
court jurisdiction). 
b. Citation to record showing issues preserved in Trial Court: Motion to Strike 
Instructions Concerning Point 0.08 Level of Breath Testing and to Limit Evidence (R. 
168)(Addendum, pg 76) 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(SEE ADDENDUM) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal in a criminal proceedings from a Judgment and Order after a Jury trial 
and conviction of Driving Under the Influence, a Third Degree Felony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1. The Defendant, Benson Manwaring, was operating a motorcycle on State Street 
at the intersection with 1860 South in Provo, Utah where he was involved in a collision 
with another vehicle which was not the fault of Mr. Manwaring. (Transcript of Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, pg. 5, R. 146) 
2. The Provo City Police Department dispatched four units to the scene of the 
accident. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 6, P.. 146) 
3. At the hearing, the Mr. Manwaring testified that after the collision his leg was 
"hurt pretty bad" that he was bleeding profusely and had other injuries when he was 
taken into the back of an ambulance. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 8, 
R. 146) 
4. After talking with the paramedics, Mr. Manwaring testified that he had a 
conversation with the officer who arrived from a group of officers standing outside. 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 9, R. 146) 
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5. The Defendant indicated that he had a conversation with an Officer who he 
remembered as Officer Bascom who asked him to take a portable breath test. (Transcript 
of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 10, R. 146) 
6. He indicated that at that time he was asked if he had been drinking and he said 
that he had a few drinks much earlier that day. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress 
Hearing, pg. 11, R. 146) 
7. The Defendant indicated that after he was told about the portable breath test 
that he said, "Will I go to jail if I do not, if I don't comply with this?" He indicated that 
the answer he was given was, "Yes". (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 11, 
R. 146) 
8. Mr. Manwaring was then asked the following: 
Q. And what was going through your mind at that point in time about that? 
A. Well, again, getting hit by a car going 50 puts you in a little bit of a 
state of shock. So it was hard for me to bring in my outside surroundings. 
Again, a large concern for me was my fiancee at the time, who I was told 
they had to rip her clothes off to treat her. To me it seemed like she might 
be in serious injury, and I was having to deal with these police officers. 
So I can't say I was in the clearest state of mind, excuse me, but 
again I would just - -1 was petitioning, because it felt like I was being 
interrogated for an accident that as it clearly state in the police report, I was 
the one that tried to avoid it. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
pg.l2,R. 146) 
9. Mr. Manwaring then described how he was required to take a portable, hand 
held breath test. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 13, R. 146) 
10. The Defense called Officer Kent Bascom who testified that he was a Provo 
officer investigating the accident in question and indicated that he talked with the 
4 
Defendant while he was in an ambulance at the scene. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress 
Hearing, pg. 34, R. 146) 
11. When asked what his first contact was with Mr. Manwaring he indicated that 
he could not recall and said "it had been a long time maybe fifteen to sixteen months 
ago". (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 34, R. 146) 
12. The officer further testified that he did not recall ever giving him a portable 
breath test (PBT). (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 35, R. 146) 
13. When first asked, he indicated that he did not even go to the hospital to meet 
with Mr. Manwaring. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 35, R. 146) 
14. The officer was later shown copies of the dispatch record set forth in the 
Exhibit Number Two, received into evidence, and he testified that he did go to the 
emergency room at the hospital according to the records. (Transcript of Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, pg. 48, R. 146) 
15. The records show that the officer was at the emergency room from 2257 hrs. 
to 2235 hrs. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 49, R. 146) 
16. The officer testified that even though he placed a specific time for the arrest of 
the Defendant that he did not recall citing or arresting the Defendant for DUI. (Transcript 
of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 50, R. 146) 
17. Upon questions by the Court, the officer indicated that Exhibit Two showed 
that at 2146 hrs. there was a dispatch concerning a portable breath test. (Transcript of 
Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 50, R. 146) 
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18. On further re-direct, he indicated that Officer Gibson was responding to a call 
to bring a portable breath test at 2146 hours while the case was being investigated. 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 58, R. 146) 
19. Upon further questioning, the officer did not recall seeing the PBT either at 
the scene or at the hospital. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, page 59.) 
20. The next witness that was called was Officer Joshua Jennings. (Transcript of 
Motion to Suppress Hearing, page 60.) 
21. Officer Jennings indicated that he placed the Defendant under arrest 
immediately after the portable breath test. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
pg.68,R. 146) 
22. He testified that he told the Defendant that he required the Defendant to 
perform "field sobriety tests" and the first thing was that he was given a horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test (HGN). (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 70, R. 146) 
23. Officer Jennings indicated that when there was conversation about blowing 
into the portable breath test and he at this time recalled that he remembered the 
Defendant asking him if he would go to jail. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
pg. 70, R. 146) 
24. He indicated that they had the conversation about jail before the portable 
breath test was resolved in his mind because he told the Defendant that he had injuries 
and would not be going to jail. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 71, R. 
146) 
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25. On cross-examination the officer indicated that he met with the Defendant at 
the hospital at 2235 hrs. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 71, R. 146) 
26. The officer indicated that at 2235 hrs. he had left the scene and gone to the 
station to get a DUI citation. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 72, R. 146) 
27. The officer, when asked if he requested the portable breath test to be brought 
to the scene testified, "I don't remember". (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
pg. 74, R. 146) 
28. Officer Jennings testified that another officer gave him the breath testing 
equipment and that he did not have any opportunity to personally calibrate the equipment 
but assume that the Provo Police Department calibrated the breath testing equipment. 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 75, R. 146) 
29. The officer indicated that during his training he was told that the breath testing 
equipment was only to be used to show "a positive or a negative and an estimated amount 
of alcohol". (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 76, R. 146) 
30. Officer Jennings testified that he specifically wrote down in his report a blood 
alcohol of "0.107" as indicated from the digital read out he obtained before immediately 
placing Mr. Manwaring under arrest. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, pg. 77, 
R. 146) 
31. The officer indicated that the portable breath testing equipment required a 
volume of air to be blow into the machine. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
pg.78,R. 146) 
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32. When the officer was asked the question as to whether he had advised the 
Defendant that he did not have to take the test he answered as follows: 
"No, I don't believe I advised him that he didn't have to." (Transcript of Motion 
to Suppress Hearing, pg. 78, line 20, R. 146) 
33. Officer Jennings testified that the Defendant asked him frequently during the 
course of the evening whether or not he was going to jail. (Transcript of Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, pg. 79, R. 146) 
34. The trial court denied the Motion. (See Addendum, pg. 21) 
EVIDENCE AND MOTIONS AT TRIAL 
Prior to trial, the Defendant made Notice of Proposed Expert Testimony in defense 
to be received at trial. (R. 457, Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 94) (Addendum pg. 45) 
Later, on the morning of trial when the jury was selected the trial judge reconsidered the 
expert based on the extensive pretrial motions and discussions. Counsel for the 
Defendant found record discussions and a ruling of the Court made in chambers. (R. 457, 
Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 94) 
The record indicated that a proffer was made concerning what he could testify to 
and the trial court made a ruling ordering that the defense could not call Gary Potter to 
the stand at trial as a witness. (R. 457 Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 94) 
Judge Lacock ruled that even though Gary Potter was qualified, the expert witness 
would not be allowed to testify with regard to the Widmark formula and to extrapolate 
back from the time of the test to the time of the operation of the vehicle. The Court ruled 
that since the State had elected to go forward at trial under the section of the DUI statute 
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that deals with results of the chemical tests at the time of the test, not at the time of 
driving, the Court could not see any reason to allow the testimony and to extrapolate back 
to the time of driving. (R. 457 Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 95) 
In reaffirming the discussions to not allow the Defendant to call the expert 
witness, the Court reviewed the history of the case in which there was a hearing on May 
9, 2008 and the State elected to proceed forward just under subsection one of the DUI 
statute. 
The Court found it irrelevant and therefore inadmissible any testimony or evidence 
as to any testimony that would be proffered or requested that would go to what Mr. 
Manwaring's blood alcohol would have been at the time of operation of the vehicle. (R. 
457 Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 99) The ruling prevented the defense from calling the 
witness and presenting evidence in any manner. Counsel for Mr. Manwaring asked 
whether or not he could cross-examine the witness from the Utah State Laboratory, Ms. 
Gambrelli, concerning questions about blood absorption to the blood test taken at 23:55 
after the arrest of Mr. Manwaring. (R. 457 Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 95) 
The Court ruled that such examination would be irrelevant because the blood 
alcohol at the time of driving would be relevant and indicated she would disallow any 
such efforts, even cross-examination, of the State's expert to bring in that kind of 
evidence(R. 457 Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 99) Counsel for the Defendant then 
stated as follows: 
[MR. GAITHER] Alright. Thank you. I understand that the Court is 
limiting the cross-examination. (R. 457 Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 99) 
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Prior to trial, counsel for the Defendant had filed Motions and Memorandum after 
the issue arose in which the State tried to limit the presentation of evidence concerning 
blood alcohol rates at the time of operation of the vehicle. This issue arose again in 
relation to Jury Instructions because the Defendant, through his attorney, had requested 
Jury Instructions and used language "in relation to the time of the operation of the 
vehicle". The Court refused to give such instructions based upon the rulings made during 
the proceedings and counsel objected to the Court not giving that instruction. (R. 457, Tr. 
(09/30/08) pg. 9) 
Counsel again referred to instructions proffered by the Defendant and essentially 
stated that, uthe Defendant is charged with a criminal offense for operating a vehicle at a 
specific time and place under the influence.'" (R. 457, Tr. (09/30/08) pg. 24) 
The Court ruled that based upon her pretrial rulings and Motions to limit 
testimony and witnesses, that the instructions proffered by the Defendant were not 
relevant based upon the fact that the State was proceeding only under subsection one of 
the DUI statute. Counsel for the Defendant was on the record and made an objection that 
the Court, in not giving the instruction and limiting the cross-examination and 
presentation of the Defendant, denied the Defendant a fair trial under the Utah State 
Constitution and the United States Constitution. In that argument, counsel for Mr. 
Manwaring indicated that the Defendant should be entitled to bring before the jury 
evidence that when he was operating the vehicle his blood alcohol level could have been 
lower than 0.08. (R. 457, Tr. (09/30/08) pg. 25) 
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The Court again reiterated the previous rulings that took into account the Millsap 
decision. The Court ruled again that the blood alcohol level at the time of operation of 
the vehicle was irrelevant. The Judge then went on to deny the Defendant his theory of 
the case which incorporated the same defense based on the time of operation. (R. 457, Tr. 
(09/30/08) pg. 27) 
The Court then ruled that only the time of the test was important and the jury 
would not consider whether or not the Defendant had a blood alcohol level over .08 when 
he was actually driving the vehicle . 
TRIAL TESTIMONY 
Provo City Police Officer Kreston Bascom after being sworn in testified on direct 
examination by the Prosecutor, Ms. Thomas, that he had been an officer for 4 1/2 years 
with Provo City. After testifying about his training he stated that he had participated in 
"maybe a dozen" arrests involving Driving Under the Influence (DUI) in 2005. He also 
testified he was trained to look for signs and symptoms of DUI. (R. 458, pg. 16) 
Officer Bascom indicated that he was dispatched to the scene of an accident on 
June 19, 2005 and received the call at 9:25 p.m. (R. 458, pg. 17) Upon arrival at the scene 
of a one motor vehicle and a motorcycle incident and first organized traffic before 
speaking with the two drivers. He stated that while interviewing Mr. Manwaring, the 
operator of the motorcycle, in the back of an ambulance the Officer "did notice the odor 
of alcohol in the ambulance". He states that the odor was from Mr. Manwaring's breath 
and "was a drinking alcohol". (R. 458, pg. 19) When asked if there were any other 
indicators of a DUI from the Defendant, the Officer stated, "It had been a long time". 
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The officer then states that he proceeded to conduct the traffic investigation and called in 
Officer Jennings to investigate the possibility of a DUI. Officer Bascom summarized the 
traffic accident in question as; ".. .it appeared that an oncoming southbound vehicle had 
crossed the center line striking Mr. Manwaring and a female on his motorcycle that were 
turning left." (R. 45 8, pg. 22) 
On cross examination by Mr. Gaither, Officer Bascom identified the driver and 
stated that he made a field diagram determining that the vehicle "crossed over the two 
yellow lines into the .. .left hand turn lane where the motorcycle was located." (R. 458, 
pg. 25) When asked if he ever found out any reason why the vehicle left its lane of travel 
and struck another vehicle the officer indicated, "I don't recall at this time, other than it 
was an elderly lady." The officer could not recall if he issued a citation nor could he 
locate any indication on the form citing, "This form is very old and it's been three years, 
so I'm not sure where I would even find it at on this right now." (R. 458, pg. 25) The 
officer indicated that when he first saw the Defendant, Mr. Manwaring was being treated 
in the ambulance lying on a gurney. When asked about the claim that he "smelled an 
odor of alcohol", the officer testified that he did not recall any report or description. 
When asked if he filled out a DUI report for this case he stated that he was only in charge 
of the traffic accident and did not file any supplemental report. (R. 458, pg. 29) 
Officer Jennings testified on direct examination that he had been a police officer 
with Provo City since December 2003. He stated that he had participated in course 
curriculum while in the academy, in-service training as a Police officer and specific 
curriculum such as signs and symptomology. (R. 458, pg. 32) He stated he was trained in 
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"standardized field sobriety testing and supplemental tests". (R. 458, pg. 33) Officer 
Jennings stated he was dispatched at 9:25 p.m. by a request from Officer Bascom to assist 
in traffic control and a DUI investigation. The officer described the scene of the accident 
with the motorcycle in the left turn lane laying on its side, the Honda vehicle pulled over 
on the side of the road, debris on the ground and "a few unopened cans of beer rolling 
around5'. (R. 458, pg. 35) Officer Jennings made initial contact with Officer Bascom who 
asked him to investigate the DUI and stated that he had "smelled an odor of an alcoholic 
beverage on the breath of the person he had determined to operate the motorcycle". (R. 
458, pg. 35) Officer Jennings testified that he made contact with Mr. Manwaring 
determined the extent of his injuries and determined there was no head injury. He stated 
that he could not observe his balance. (R. 458, pg. 37) The officer arrived at the accident 
at 9:44 p.m. and the Defendant was arrested at 10:40 p.m. (R. 458, pg. 44) The Defendant 
was transported to the hospital and the officer met up with the Defendant in the 
emergency room. (R. 458, pg. 45) After a nystagamus test the officer testified he 
administered a portable breath test. (R. 458, pg. 46) The witness testified after placing the 
Defendant under arrest he later obtained a blood sample. (R. 458, pg. 48) 
On cross-examination Mr. Gaither questioned Officer Jennings about his training 
and use of the Intoxilyzer 5000 and 8000. (R. 458, pg. 51) The officer then stated that he 
did not observe actual operation of the vehicle by the Defendant nor did he include a time 
of operation of the vehicle by the Defendant and stated, "No, I left that to Officer Bascom 
and his traffic incident report". (R. 458, pg. 53) The officer then testified that he had to 
leave the Defendant in the care of the paramedics to retrieve an alcohol report form and 
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that the officer had to call to have the Intoxilyzer brought to him. (R. 458, pg. 56) When 
asked if he knew if the paramedics had given the Defendant any medication or if he 
instructed them not to the officer replied, "I let the paramedics treat the patients." (R. 
458, pg. 57) The Officer testified he wrote down "normal" speech on the DUI report 
form. (R. 458, pg. 59) 
David Harper testified that he is the owner of Forensic Nursing Services and is 
also employed at Intermountain Health Care at American Fork hospital as a nursing 
supervisor. (R. 458, pg. 74) The witness explained his training and forms used citing a 
chain of custody form from the state. (R. 458, pg. 77) Upon Voir Dire examination, the 
Defendant's attorney asked about forms and the witness testified he had with him at 
Court the DUI analysis request form. The witness stated he did not have the record of the 
name of the blood-draw and the date and the only way he could relate to the case was by 
agency number. (R. 458, pg. 78) When asked what the agency case number was the 
witness replied, "This one is incorrect." (R. 458, pg. 80) The witness indicated that the 
form had no corrections and contained the date of birth, driver's license, time and date. 
The witness stated that he had "reprinted over it". (R. 458, pg. 82) 
Gambrelli Layco, Director of the Forensic Toxicology Lab for the State of Utah, 
testified upon direct examination that she had previously qualified in the Utah State 
Courts as a forensic alcohol analysis. (R. 458, pg. 118) The witness testified that she has 
testified as an expert regarding the effects of alcohol on the human body 15-20 times in 
district and justice courts. (R. 458, pg. 118) The witness testified about the methods used 
in the laboratory to test for blood alcohol and training of the instrument. (R. 458, pg. 123) 
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The witness proceeded to explain the testing procedure explaining how the test is, " . . . 
run on a vial which is just a portion of the original sample". (R. 458, pg. 124) Gambrelli 
Lay co explained the procedure, paper work and chain of possession upon receipt of blood 
samples received in the mail. (R. 458, pg.128) Ms. Layco stated that blood samples may 
stay in a refrigerator for up to 21 days but are usually tested within a week. (R. 458, pg. 
129) The witness stated that the technician relies on the lab case number that follows the 
sample throughout its time at the lab and that each technician initials the vial once 
performing an action. The testing samples are run through the instrument sequentially 
and each sample is tested by injection twice to receive two values. The sample and 
results are then collected in a case file. (R. 458, pg. 134) The witness stated that Mr. 
Manwaring's blood sample was submitted by David Harper of Forensic Nursing Services 
and received on June 21, 2005 at 12:30 p.m. (R. 458, pg. 137) witness explained the 
chain of custody of samples received by mail and stated that she had nothing to with the 
receipt or testing of the sample. (R. 458, pg. 143) 
LOWER COURT RULING 
The Court denied the Motion to Suppress after an evidentiary hearing. Thereafter, 
a jury trial was held and prior to trial the Judge granted the State's Motions to Limit 
Evidence and ordered the Defendant not to call a designated expert to the stand. The 
court ordered a limitation of cross-examination of the States' Expert. The Court refused 
to grant instructions concerning blood alcohol at the time of operation of the vehicle. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Manwaring received a felony conviction for "Driving Under the 
Influence" after he was unconstitutionally deprived the opportunity to present a defense. 
The appellant was prohibited from calling an expert witness and cross-examining the 
States expert witness on the issue of his blood alcohol at the time he was driving. This 
error was compounded by limiting jury instructions that would have directed the jury to 
the material issue of a driving under the influence prosecution. 
The Defendant also appeals the pretrial ruling denying motion to suppress 
the blood draw. The blood test was taken after the arrest of the Defendant and Mr. 
Manwaring was required on sanction of the threat of jail to submit to an inaccurate hand 
held portable test before his arrest. On the basis of the pre-arrest test he was required to 
take a blood test. The Defendant submits the blood test should be suppressed because he 
was required to take a pre-arrest test while detained. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING ALL INFORMATION 
OBTAINED INCLUDING THE SECOND CHEMICAL FOLLOWING A PRE-
ARREST CHEMICAL TEST USING A PORTABLE TEST 
In Salt Lake City v. Steven R. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), the Court 
discussed field sobriety test in relation to an arrest for Driving Under the Influence. The 
Court noted that under Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution a person couldn't be 
compelled to give law enforcement evidence against him. The Court created a test to 
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determine whether or not the person is being compelled to give evidence. The Court 
indicated trial judges should review to see whether the Defendant was or was not in 
custody and whether or not the person was significantly deprived of his freedom is a 
critical factor. In Carrier, the Court indicated that the traditional field sobriety tests do 
not violate the privilege against self incrimination only if the evidence does not indicate 
the Defendant was compelled "in some other way" to perform tests. Carrier at 1169. The 
Court did not address the issue of a person giving evidence by means of a hand held 
portable device to test blood alcohol. The Appellant submits that the trial court did not 
correctly apply Carrier. 
The Defendant submits that only after a person has been arrested does the implied 
consent law compel and allow the seizure of a person's non-voluntary blood or breath 
sample. Prior to arrest the Utah implied consent law has no application. The implied 
consent law states: 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6a-520. Implied consent to chemical tests for 
alcohol or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, report. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's 
breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether 
the person was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while: 
(i) having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 4l-6a-502, 41-6a-530, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; 
(ii) under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41 -6a-502; or 
(iii) having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a 
controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6a-517. 
(b) A test or tests authorized under this Subsection (1) must be 
administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe 
that person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
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vehicle while in violation of any provision under Subsections (l)(a)(i) 
through (iii). (See Addendum, pg. iii) 
In State vs. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah 1968), the driver of an automobile was 
involved in a serious accident and was taken to the hospital for examination and 
treatment. At the hospital, the investigating officers asked the person to submit to a 
blood test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood. Although the driver refused to 
submit to the test, a blood sample was drawn and a blood analysis was performed. At 
trial, the result of the blood test was admitted into evidence. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the language of Section 41-6-44.10.] The Court determined that actual 
consent was required to obtain a blood and alcohol test where a person was not under 
arrest. The Court in Cruz held that implied consent is valid only in correct situations. 
Mr. Manwaring submitted to the trial court that his was such a situation, since the officers 
used testing instruments and the results from equipment is not admissible in Court 
without proving valid consent and waiver of a constitutional right. 
The Utah Supreme Court again found that the results of a chemical test of the 
person's blood sample were inadmissible because the Defendant neither impliedly nor 
actually consented to the testing procedure. In In Re I.R.L., a person under 18 years, 739 
P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), affirmed 111 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989). In this decision, the 
Cruz ruling was affirmed and the Court found that the person was neither under arrest nor 
in a condition rendering him incapable of refusing the test when the chemical test was 
given. 
1
 Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.10 has been renumbered and is now found under 41-6a-
520. 
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Mr. Manwaring was contacted while receiving emergency medical care. He was 
told about the breath test and inquired, "Will I go to jail if I do not, if I don't comply with 
this?" He indicated that the answer he was given was, "Yes". (Transcript of Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, R. 456, pg. 11) Mr. Manwaring was then asked the following: 
Q. And what was going through your mind at that point in time about that? 
A. Well, again, getting hit by a car going 50 puts you in a little bit of a 
state of shock. So it was hard for me to bring in my outside surroundings. 
Again, a large concern for me was my fiancee at the time, who I was told 
they had to rip her clothes off to treat her. To me it seemed like she might 
be in serious injury, and I was having to deal with these police officers. 
So I can't say I was in the clearest state of mind, excuse me, but 
again I would just - -1 was petitioning, because it felt like I was being 
interrogated for an accident that as it clearly state in the police report, I was 
the one that tried to avoid it. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
page 12.) 
Mr. Manwaring then described how he was required to take a portable, hand held 
breath test. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, R. 456, pg. 13) The defense 
called Officer Kent Bascom who testified that he was a Provo officer investigating the 
accident in question and indicated that he talked with the Defendant while he was in an 
ambulance at the scene. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, R. 456, pg. 34) The 
Portable Test was the last test administered before the arrest of Mr. Manwaring and the 
blood test compelled by the Implied consent sanctions. 
In State v. Whitney, 889 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. App. 06/30/2008), the Appellate court in 
Indiana held that Portable Breath Tests may not be administered randomly. The Court 
noted in that in Schmidt v. State 816 N.E.2d 925, 943 (Ind. Ct. App.2005.), the Indiana 
courts had indicated that "the only significant difference between field sobriety tests and 
breath tests is that unlike field sobriety tests, breath tests require probable cause to 
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administer." The Indiana courts had ruled that officers "cannot offer a breath test to a 
suspect, and the suspect cannot consent or refuse the test, until after the officer had 
probable cause" to believe an alcohol crime is at issue. Datzek v. State 838 N.E.2d 1149, 
1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006.) The Court stated that: 
It appears our legislature intended to differentiate between chemical tests and 
PBTs. PBTs provide a simple method for a threshold determination whether a 
person has consumed alcohol. While PBT results are not admissible at trial, they 
can help officers determine whether to offer standardized chemical tests that are 
admissible to demonstrate intoxication. See State v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 431, 433 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (PBT results admissible at suppression hearing to 
demonstrate probable cause; "[W]e see no difference in the officer's use of the 
[PBT] than in the use of manual dexterity tests such as the finger-to-nose test, to 
determine intoxication, the use of which tests are unquestioned."), reh'g denied, 
trans, denied. Because PBTs and chemical tests have different functions, we see 
no reason to require probable cause for PBTs.*fn5 
Nevertheless, we share the trial court's concern that such a holding may interpreted 
to "permit officers to offer/administer PBTs whenever a vehicle was stopped for 
any infraction, with no indication of alcohol whatsoever. ".(App. at 81.) Therefore, 
we explicitly hold PBTs may not be administered randomly: 
As a general rule automobile drivers are not shorn of their Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections when they leave their homes and enter their automobiles. 
Police Officers may only search an automobile or seize occupants upon obtaining 
a warrant or upon having probable cause to believe a crime has been committed or 
is being committed by occupants of the vehicle. 
An exception exists when the officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon 
specific and articulable facts, and rational inferences from those facts that the 
occupants are committing a crime or are about to commit a crime. In such a case 
the officer may briefly detain the occupants to conduct a limited "non-invasive" 
search such as a "pat down" for weapons, a license and registration check, or field 
sobriety tests. Because Deputy Blacker had the reasonable suspicion to support a 
PBT, we reverse the grant of Whitney's motion to suppress and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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In State v. Morgan, No. No. 2008-P-0098 (Ohio App. Dist.l 1 06/12/2009), the 
Court of Appeals Eleventh Appellate District Court in Ohio noted in foot-note 3 to the 
decision that: 
There is a split of authority among appellate districts regarding the admissibility of 
portable breath tests, "even for probable cause purposes." State v. Derov, 176 Ohio 
App.3d 43, 2008-Ohio-1672, at [^10. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted Derov for 
review as a certified conflict with State v. Gunther, No. 04CA25, 2005-Ohio-3492, 
on the following issue: "Whether the results of a portable breath test are 
admissible to establish probable cause to arrest a suspect for a drunk driving 
offense." State v. Derov, 118 Ohio St.3d 1503, 2008-Ohio-5467. Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court reversed Derov on other grounds and dismissed all pending issues 
relative to portable breath tests. State v. Derov, 121 Ohio St 3d 269, 2009-Ohio-
1111, atTJTfl-3. 
The "portable breath test" is a scientific test performed by equipment not certified 
by the Utah Highway patrol as an approved device to test a sample of breath for forensic 
purposes. The equipment is a does not involve the law enforcement officer evaluating 
with his own senses an operators dexterity and should not be considered a "field sobriety 
test". The device is a shortcut that results in the officer not taking the time to personally 
evaluate a driver suspected of driving with a prohibited blood alcohol level. 
The prosecution usually argues that the portable test that gives a digital readout 
only is used as a field test because it is used for the limited purpose to determine if a 
driver consumed alcohol. However, the facts here invalidate such a rationale. Officer 
Jennings testified that he specifically wrote down in his report a blood alcohol of "0.107" 
as indicated from the digital read out he obtained before immediately placing Mr. 
Manwaring under arrest. (R. 456, pg. 77) This is not just an indication of drinking but a 
measurement of blood alcohol in relation to the statutorily prohibited level. 
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In the matter on appeal, Officer did not offer any field tests except the H.G.N, test. 
The breath sample immediately prior to the arrest was the material and only reason for 
the arrest, except for limited evidence of an odor of alcohol. Since the device is not and 
was not properly certified, any mistaken reliance on the chemical test to establish 
probable cause renders any probable cause finding unsupportable. In addition, the 
Prosecution should have been required to prove the Defendant was not compelled to 
incriminate himself and waived his right to not submit to the hand held testing device 
before it was administered. 
In order to deter officers from using improper pre-arrest tests under the guise of a 
field sobriety test, the Court should reject the use of the device to establish probable 
cause to arrest. The legislature has the power to require certification and require the 
purchase of correct equipment if pre-arrest chemical tests are to be authorized under the 
Implied Consent law. Further, the Implied Consent law provides that an officer can 
require a person to submit to a breath test only if a person has been placed under arrest. 
Then a peace officer is justified in requiring a person to submit to a chemical test on a 
certified machine. The portable test is the last test given prior to a person being 
handcuffed. This fact should create a presumption that the last test was the determinative 
basis for the arrest. A pre-arrest chemical test to determine probable cause cannot rely on 
implied consent. 
In People v. Race, 643 N.E.2d 865 (1994), the Illinois Court held that a portable 
breath test was properly excluded by at trial court. There, the Illinois legislature 
subsequently passed specific legislation to permit pre-arrest use of Portable Breath Tests. 
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The State of Utah has not passed legislation to allow portable breath tests to be used to 
administer pre-arrest chemical tests and the tests are illegal searches, not field sobriety 
tests as contended by law enforcement. The implied consent law defines the breath tests 
to be post-arrest, not pre-arrest. 
In Leslie vs. State of Alaska, 811 P.2d 575 (Alaska App. 1986). The Court of 
Appeals in Alaska held that the administration of a breath test is a search included under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Leslie, the Alaska Court, 
based upon a specific Alaskan statutes which does not exist in the State of Utah indicated 
that the use of pre-arrest portable breath test could be authorized as a reasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment is involved in breath 
tests and the test is not merely evidence, but evidence subject to Fourth Amendment 
requirements. Because the Defendant was not under arrest, the Implied Consent law does 
not create an exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
The Prosecution will always acknowledge, as in this matter, that the portable 
handheld test results cannot use at trial in evidence. However, the result of the portable 
breath-testing device was used to obtain a sample of the Defendant's blood alcohol after 
arrest. The Defendant contends the subsequent chemical test, taken after the arrest, is 
inadmissible as a direct result of the use of the pre arrest chemical test if it violates the 
Fourth Amendment. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471(1963). The relevant test 
under Wong Sun is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the 
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that 
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illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint." 
The seizure or obtaining of a breath sample of person prior to an arrest is not 
within the implied consent exception to the Constitutional provisions and the statutory 
provisions. Further, where there is the seizure by subterfuge, or by misinforming the 
person that he will be arrested if he does not take the test, there can be no finding of 
consent. A driver should be informed that he might voluntarily submit to a pre-arrest 
chemical test and waive his constitutional right to incriminate himself. 
Constitutional safeguards become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of 
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420,(1984). In Berkemer, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that 
though "a traffic stop significantly curtails the 'freedom of action'" of the driver, id. at 
436, 104 S. Ct. at 3148, the stop does not become custodial for Miranda purposes unless 
the circumstances of the stop "exert upon [the] detained person pressures that sufficiently 
impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 437, 104 S. Ct. 
at 3149. Thus, "[a] person may be 'seized' for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be 'in 
custody' for Fifth Amendment purposes." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, atl 147 (Utah 
1996). 
Under Utah law, to determine whether a suspect was in custody with reference to 
four factors: "'(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the 
accused; (3) whether objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form 
of interrogation.'" State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996) (quoting Salt Lake 
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City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, (Utah 1983)). The Court has indicated that '"in deciding 
the custody issue, the totality of the circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is 
dispositive."1 State v. Worthington, 970 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In this matter, the Court should have found that there was sufficient custody in the 
ambulance that a Miranda warning should have been given or that the statement was 
involuntary. The Defendant was later contacted in the hospital and invoked his Miranda 
Rights. 
The Utah Statute does not contemplate application of the Implied Consent to 
special pre-arrest chemical tests to measure blood /alcohol levels by handheld devises 
used by the police. It does not does not bring within the implied consent law the use of 
portable breath testing equipment as a "field sobriety test". Further, the administration of 
a chemical test prior to the time that the person is placed under arrest violates the Utah 
Statute designed to allow compelled tests. It is this prior illegality taints the later 
obtained breath test or blood test on the Intoxilyzer and the United States Constitution 
requires the suppression of that test result. 
POINT II 
THE COURT RULINGS DENIED THE DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL AND HIS 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN NOT ALLOWING MR. MANWARING TO 
PRESENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO THE DEFENDANT'S 
ALCOHOL LEVEL AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENCE 
Prior to trial, the Defendant made notice of proposed expert testimony in defense 
to be received at trial. (R. 457, Tr. [09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 94, Addendum pg. 45) The 
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State objected by pretrial motion to the expert. See Motion to Exclude Expert Witness 
filed by State of Utah(R. 141-135, Addendum p. 55) 
Later on the morning of trial after the jury was selected, the trial judge 
reconsidered the defense and the expert's proffered testimony. The trial court ordered that 
the defense could not call Gary Potter to the stand at trial as a witness (R. 457, Tr. 
[09/29/08 a.m. session] pg. 94) 
Judge Laycock ruled that even though Gary Potter was qualified, he would not be 
allowed to testify with regard to the "Widmark formula". The Defendant was denied the 
opportunity to present to the Jury evidence concerning the extrapolation back from the 
time of the test to the time of the operation of the vehicle. The Court ruled that since the 
State had elected to go forward at trial under sub-section one of the DUI statute there was 
no reason to allow the testimony. (R. 457, Tr. (09/29/08 a.m. session) pg. 95) A review 
of the resume of Gary Potter indicates his expert credentials and the Court determined he 
was qualified to give relevant evidence of extrapolation back to the time of drving. Mr. 
Potter has been qualified to testify in Courts throughout Utah and has testified in Park 
City Justice Court, Murray Justice Court, Salt Lake Justice Court, Davis County District 
Court, and Salt Lake (3rd) District courts. (R. 136 to 139) In not allowing the Defendant 
to call the expert witness, the Court reviewed the history of the case in which there was a 
hearing on May 9, 2008 and the State elected to proceed forward just under subsection 
one of the DUI statute. 
The ruling not only prevented the defense from calling the expert witness, counsel 
for Mr. Manwaring was ordered not to cross-examine the witness from the Utah State 
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Laboratory, Ms. Gambrelli, concerning questions about blood absorption to the blood test 
taken at 23:55 after the arrest of Mr. Manwaring. (R. 457, Tr. (09/29/08 a.m. session) pg. 
95) The Court ruled that such testimony would be irrelevant and granted the State's 
Motion because the blood alcohol at the time of driving would be relevant and indicated 
she would disallow any such efforts, even cross-examination, of the State's expert to 
bring in that kind of evidence(R. 457, Tr. (09/29/08 a.m. session) pg. 99) 
In pretrial memorandums and up to the ruling, the Defendant cited for the defense 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-516. That statute provides as follows: 
41-6a-516. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving 
under the influence — Weight of evidence^ 1) (a) In any civil or criminal 
action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was 
operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in 
Section 41-6a-520 are admissible as evidence.(b) (i) In a criminal 
proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6a-520 does not render the 
results of a chemical test inadmissible.(ii) Evidence of a defendant's blood 
or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when 
prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.(2) This section does 
not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to 
a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at the time 
relevant to the alleged offense. (See Addendum, pg. ii) 
The Defendant disputed whether the State could not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that his blood alcohol level was above the legal limit at the time of his actual 
operation of the vehicle. By granting the State's Motions, the expert witness retained by 
the Defendant was excluded and a traditional defense eliminated. The Defendant submits 
that this is equivalent to a directed verdict on an element of the offense in criminal 
proceedings in favor of the State and in violation of the Constitution. 
27 
This issue arose again in relation to Jury Instructions because the Defendant, 
through his attorney, had requested Jury Instructions and used language "in relation to the 
time of the operation of the vehicle". The Court refused to give such instructions based 
upon the rulings made during the proceedings and counsel objected to the Court not 
giving that instruction. (R. 456, Tr. (09/30/08) pg. 9) 
The Court ruled that the instructions proffered by the Defendant were not relevant 
based upon the fact that the State was proceeding only under subsection one of the DUI 
statute. Counsel for the Defendant presented the objections that the Court, in not giving 
the instruction and limiting the cross-examination and presentation of the Defendant, 
denied the Defendant a fair trial under the Utah State Constitution and the United States 
Constitution. In that argument, counsel for Mr. Manwaring indicated that the Defendant 
should be entitled to bring before the jury evidence that when he was operating the 
vehicle his blood alcohol level could have been lower than 0.08. (R. 456, Tr. (09/30/08) 
pg. 25) 
The Court again reiterated the previous rulings that took into account the Millsap 
decision and the statute ruled again that the Court would not allow use of blood alcohol 
level at the time of operation of the vehicle. The Judge then went on to deny the 
Defendant Instructions as to his theory of the case that incorporated the same defense. (R. 
456, Tr. (09/30/08) pg. 27) 
The Defendant submitted and argued for the following relevant jury instructions 
which were denied: 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
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The Defendant is charged with a criminal offence for operating a vehicle at a 
specific time and place under the influence. If, from the evidence, you have a reasonable 
doubt as to whether or not the Defendant's blood alcohol was the 0.08 or greater at the 
time he was actually operating the vehicle you should find the Defendant Not Guilty. 
The Defendant's theory of the case is that while he did consume alcohol, the 
alcohol had not entered his blood stream at the time he was actually operating the vehicle 
and his blood alcohol went above the 0.08 level only at a time in which he was not 
operating the motor vehicle. (R. 288) 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a 
person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol or with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a 
chemical test administered at the direction of a police officer having grounds to believe 
the person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle having 
a blood alcohol level prohibited by law are admissible as evidence. 
This section does not prevent the jury from considering otherwise admissible 
evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level at the time relevant to the 
alleged offense of driving under the influence. (R.291) 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is the Defendant's theory of the case that the State cannot prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that any alleged operation of the motorcycle was while Mr. Manv/aring 
was either under the influence or that his blood alcohol level was more than 0.08. 
If after consideration of all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the Defendant's blood alcohol was above 0.08 then you should not find the Defendant 
guilty of driving a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of more than 0.08, even though a 
subsequent test give after the time of the actual operation of the motor vehicle was in 
excess of 0.08. (R.287) 
The evidence available to the Court at the Motion to Suppress hearing indicated 
that prior to taking the blood test, the Defendant was subjected to treatment for injuries 
that could have involved cleaning of his wounds with alcohol and other hospital 
emergency room services. The toxicology tests indicated that the blood sample 
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registered at 0.10. This is a range within which evidence of the blood alcohol curve is 
relevant to prove the blood alcohol at the time of operation of the vehicle. 
The Defendant submits that the ruling of the Court unconstitutionally deprived Mr. 
Manwaring the opportunity to present a defense. Further, the State limited the Defendant 
from presenting to the jury the Defendant's test results, which under the facts and 
circumstances of the case, could have been lower than 0.08 at the time of operation of the 
motor vehicle. Even though the Court limited by instruction evidence of a test it would 
have the same effect as directing a verdict that would deny the Defendant his 
constitutional right to present a defense and have a jury determine all of the elements of 
his criminal offence. 
In Victor v. Nebraska 511 U.S. 1 (1994), the United States Supreme Court, citing 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, reaffirmed that the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense in a criminal offense. A federal 
constitutional error in omitting an instruction that the prosecution has the burden to prove 
each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt is a structural, instrumental 
error under Sullivan v. Louisiana 508 U.S. 275 (1999). Here Mr. Manwaring submits 
that driving while actually under the influence at the time of driving is an element that the 
State is required to prove in order to prove the offense of Driving Under the Influence. 
In Sullivan, the Court noted that the Sixth Amendment includes the right to have a 
jury, rather than a judge, find a criminal defendant guilty. It further noted the Fifth 
Amendment's due process clause, which applies to both state and federal criminal 
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proceedings, imposes on the prosecution the burden to prove each element of an offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Interpreting those constitutional provisions, Sullivan stated: 
"It is self-evident, we think, that the Fifth Amendment requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement 
of a jury verdict are interrelated. It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment 
to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty, and then 
leave it up to the judge to determine (as [In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 
358] requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In other 
words, the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict 
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(Sullivan, supra, at p. 278.) 
The expert to be called for the State admitted that there is also a variance of plus 
or minus so many points in relation to any type of testing. Further, the Defendant 
submitted that experts would have to admit that the variance increases or decreases 
depending on the time of the taking of the blood sample and the designated period of 
time. It is a scientific fact that alcohol ingested by a person may be located in the 
stomach and is not processed into the blood stream until a later time. 
The exclusion of experts and limitation of cross-examination should be found to 
have unconstitutionally denied the Defendant the fundamental right to present a defense. 
In State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, (Utah 2007), the Court stated: 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits 
state governments from "depriv[ing any person] of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. "In the context of criminal prosecutions, the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the 
government must not offend "those fundamental conceptions of justice 
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, and which define 
the community's sense of fair play and decency. "But the Court has 
31 
"defined the category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness1 very 
narrowly." At para 72 
The Defendant submits the Court should apply the test of State v. Bakalov, 979 
P.2d 799, (Utah 1999), where the Court stated: 
Defendant's second due process argument is more credible. Generally, a 
defendant's right to a fair trial assures the defendant access to the "'basic tools'" or 
"raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense." Ake v. Oklahoma, 
470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 
(1971)). In this case, defendant argues that he was deprived of those tools when 
the trial court refused to permit his testing of the Code R semen sample. We do not 
agree. 
Defendant's second due process argument is more credible. Generally, a 
defendant's right to a fair trial assures the defendant access to the ""basic tools'" or 
"raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense." Ake v. Oklahoma, 
470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 
(1971)). In this case, defendant argues that he was deprived of those tools when 
the trial court refused to permit his testing of the Code R semen sample. We do not 
agree. 
While denying relief based upon the facts of the rape tests, the Court in Bakalov 
acknowledged that fundamental fairness maybe violated when a criminal defendant is 
denied the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing. The Court indicated such a 
ruling must be bound by appropriate safeguards imposed by the Court, examine a piece 
of critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion. The Court cited 
Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1975). The Court in Bakalov ruled 
that there is no such violation when the evidence to be evaluated is not "critical." At para 
69. The Court cited Gray v. Rowley, 604 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1979) indicating that the 
violation occurs if there is critical evidence that is material evidence of substantial 
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probative force that could induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to 
avoid a conviction. 
The Appellant submits that the denial of the defense deprived a fundamentally fair 
trial and his due process rights which requires reversal and a new trial if subsection one 
of the statute is held constitutional. 
POINT III 
THE DUI STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §41-6A-502(A)(I) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND SUBSECTION (1) OF 
41-6A-502 OF THE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE STATUTE AS APPLIED 
AND ON ITS FACE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Defendant argued in extensive pretrial motions to the Court that the first 
prong of the DUI statute that unconstitutionally criminalizes a person if a subsequent test 
exceeds 0.08. This Court should reverse the denial of that motion and rule on appeal that 
the subsection of the statute that criminalizes conduct without regard to operation of 
vehicle is void for vagueness. Under this statute, a citizen is aware of the Driving Under 
the Influence statute that prohibits a person from operating a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. 
On appeal the Court should review first the clause of the statute to determine 
whether it creates the evidentiary presumption that limited the Defendant's defense. 
Secondly, the Court should evaluate whether the section limits the evidence required to 
prove an offence as argued by the Utah County Attorney's Office. The trial Court erred 
in determining that specific sub-section was not void for vagueness. 
33 
This issue was reserved for future determination in State v. Millsap, 2006 UT App 
298 (Utah App. 07/13/2006), the Court stated: 
As amended, Utah Code section 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) reads:[15] A person 
may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: [16] (i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a 
subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath 
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test. . . .[17] 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2002).[18] A person challenging 
a statute as vague on its face must show that it is impermissibly vague in all 
of its applications. See Greenwood v. North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819-
20 (Utah 1991). "A [party] who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the 
conduct of others." Id. at 820 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flip-
side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). Accordingly, a 
court must examine the complaining party's own conduct "before analyzing 
other hypothetical applications of the law." Id. If a statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague as it applies to the complaining party, it is not void 
for vagueness on its face. See id. In State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 366, 100 
P.3d 231, we ruled that the appellants lacked standing to assert a facial 
challenge for vagueness because they "raised no uncertainty regarding the 
statute's proscription of their conduct," and accordingly, "we refuse[d] their 
invitation to conjure conditions under which the statute could be vague." Id. 
at ^45.[20] Millsap does not demonstrate that the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. 
The Defendant had standing and with this response and challenged the statute as 
applied to him and generally to all persons. The ruling that the Defendant should not be 
able to offer the admissible evidence in his defense demonstrates the unconstitutionality 
of this action. 
The pretrial motion filed by the State prior to trial demonstrates the problem with 
subsection (1) of the statute. The State specifically foreclosed a defense based upon the 
Defendant's blood alcohol at the time of driving and attempts to convict him of a felony 
for a blood alcohol test at a later date and time. As applied in this case the statute is 
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unconstitutional based upon the specific facts in this matter. Further, this section will 
deny other persons their constitutional rights. 
The relevant statute states: 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration.^ A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person: (a) has 
sufficient alcohol in the person fs body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test, 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of operation or actual physical control.(2) 
Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.(3) A violation of this 
section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510. 
(Amended by Chapter 91, 2005 General Session Renumbered and 
Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 General Session) 
The Defendant submits Subsection (1) is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as 
Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Utah Constitution. The United States Supreme Court 
stated in Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) as follows: 
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. 
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague 
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, Judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
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subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. Third, but related, where a vague statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of 
basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of 
freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the 
unlawful zone'. . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked." 
The Utah Supreme Court has echoed the principles set forth in Grayned 
:Vagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., 
whether the statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct. In State v. 
Theobald, we held that" statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is 
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited." State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 1987) 
In considering whether a statute is overbroad, a trial court should have considered 
whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. 
State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267 (Utah App. 08/12/2004) The Appellate Courts have 
instructed the Courts to examine criminal statutes with particular care; those that make 
unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially 
invalid even if they also have legitimate application. In State v. Norris, the Court 
indicated: 
When interpreting the challenged language, "we look to the 
statute's plain language and presume that the legislature used each term 
advisedly." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at A^16. "Statutory language is 
overbroad if its language proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior." 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
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enforcement." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) page 1265 
(citations omitted). 
The application of a common sense application of the offense and the defenses 
which should be available to every person charged with a driving under the influence 
charge is set forth in State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 12/17/1998). The court 
stated concerning the conclusive presumption under the former statute as follows: 
Preece is correct that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to 
evidence on the absorptive and metabolic rates of alcohol. The trial court 
concluded that, under Utah Code Ann § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998), an 
intoxilyzer test taken within two hours of the stop and showing an alcohol level 
above .08 triggers a conclusive presumption that Preece had an alcohol level 
above .08 at the time of the stop. Not only is there no such conclusive 
presumption, there is no such presumption of any kind. See City of Orem v. 
Crandall, 760 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). Indeed, in Crandall, we 
concluded that section 41-6-44(2), then codified at section 41-6-44(1), was 
constitutional precisely because it carried no presumption. See 760 P.2d at 
923-24. On the contrary, "the defendant [is allowed] to challenge the accuracy of 
the test on any relevant ground." Id. at 924. 
Therefore, Mr. Manwaring requests that this Court of Appeals should reverse the 
trial Court and remand for a ruling that Subsection (1) of Utah Code Annotated §41-6a-
502 of the driving under the influence statute as applied to Mr. Manwaring is 
unconstitutional and on its face is unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
This appeal presents a significant issue concerning the administration of justice in 
the State of Utah. Based upon the reality that many DUI offenses are being enhanced to 
Third Degree felonies, the charge of Driving Under the Influence previously categorized 
as misdemeanor cases are now felonies which will require greater scrutiny and exacting 
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instruction on the elements by the District Courts. This case presents a situation that 
demonstrates that unlike almost every felony offense, the language of the statue as 
drafted by the legislature limits defenses to the charges. The scope of the offense under 
the subsection challenged on this appeal has broadened the offense from "Driving Under 
the Influence" to "testing for a blood alcohol in excess of 0.08 at any time a person has 
operated a vehicle" . The Defendant respectfully submits that the Utah State Constitution 
and the United States Constitution should afford the opportunity to present a defense 
based upon whether he was under the influence when he was actually driving the vehicle, 
not whether he was under the influence when later tested. 
A related and important issue concerns the pre-arrest chemical tests. Law 
enforcement officers routinely require people to take pre-arrest tests before subjecting 
them to the post-arrest tests that can result in felony convictions. The prosecution must 
prove voluntary consent and waiver of constitutional rights that was not required here by 
the trial Court. Therefore, the Defendant requests that the Court remand the case setting 
aside the conviction and ordering a new trial. Further, after the new trial there should be 
all evidence of the blood test taken after the illegal pre-arrest portable test suppressed 
from evidence. 
The Court should rule the section upon which the Defendant was convicted in the 
unfair trial is unconstitutional and order the trial Court to dismiss the Information. In the 
alternative, the Defendant should be awarded a new trial with the evidence of the blood 
test suppressed. 
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